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Abstract. Information retrieval systems have traditionally been evaluated over absolute judgments of relevance: each document is judged
for relevance on its own, independent of other documents that may be
on topic. We hypothesize that preference judgments of the form “document A is more relevant than document B” are easier for assessors to
make than absolute judgments, and provide evidence for our hypothesis
through a study with assessors. We then investigate methods to evaluate
search engines using preference judgments. Furthermore, we show that
by using inferences and clever selection of pairs to judge, we need not
compare all pairs of documents in order to apply evaluation methods.

1

Introduction

Relevance judgments for information retrieval evaluation have traditionally been
made on a binary scale: a document is either relevant to a query or it is not.
This definition of relevance is largely motivated by the importance of topicality
in tasks studied in IR research [1].
The notion of relevance can be generalized to a graded scale of absolute
judgments. Järvelin and Kekäläinen [2] proposed doing so to identify very relevant documents in addition to relevant and non-relevant documents. They developed the discounted cumulative gain (DCG) measure to summarize performance
taking into account both graded relevance and greater importance for items retrieved at the top ranks. DCG has been used to evaluate web search applications
where the first few results are especially important. In web search applications,
factors other than topical relevance, such as quality of information, quality of
display, or important of the site, are often included in assessing relevance.
Although evaluations over graded relevance allow for finer distinctions among
documents, adopting graded relevance has two significant drawbacks. First, the
specifics of the gradations (i.e. how many levels to use and what those levels
mean) must be defined, and it is not clear how these choices will affect relative
performance measurements. Second, the burden on assessors increases with the
complexity of the relevance gradations; when there are more factors or finer
distinctions to consider, the choice of label is less clear. High measured levels of
disagreement on binary judgments [3] suggests the difficulty of the problem.

When measurement is difficult in practice or not completely objective, judgments of preference may be a good alternative [4]. Instead of assigning a relevance
label to a document, an assessor looks at two pages and expresses a preference
for one over the other. This is a binary decision, so there is no need to determine
a set of labels and no need to map judgments to a numeric scale.
Of course, using preference judgments poses a new set of questions: how do
we use preference judgments to evaluate a search engine? The number of pairs
of documents is polynomial in the number of documents; will it be feasible to
ask for judgments on every pair? If not, which pairs do we choose? But these
questions are more amenable to empirical investigation.
There is another advantage to direct preference judgments: algorithms such
as RankNet [5] and ranking SVMs [6] are trained over preferences. Sometimes
preferences are obtained by inference from absolute judgments [5]. By collecting
preferences directly, some of the noise associated with difficulty in distinguishing between different levels of relevance may be reduced. Additionally, absolute
judgments result in ties in inferred preferences; direct preferences may allow
more data to be used for training.
In this work we follow three successive lines of investigation. First, we compare assessor agreement and time spent per judgment for preference and absolute
judgments. Next, we consider the evaluation of search engines when judgments
are preferences. Finally, we look at focusing assessor effort to collect sufficient
preferences to be able to compare search engines accurately.

2

Previous Work

The idea of pairwise preference judgments has not been explored much in the IR
literature. When the idea of preference judgments has arisen, the practice has
typically been to infer preferences from existing absolute judgments (e.g. [7, 8]),
sidestepping questions about collecting preferences directly.
The most closely related previous work is that of Joachims, who first hypothesized that a click could be treated as a preference judgment (the document
clicked being preferred to all ranked above it) [6], then used an eye-tracking study
to verify that hypothesis [9]. Neither work touched on questions of evaluation.
Buckley and Voorhees’s bpref evaluation measure [10] is calculated by summing the number of relevant documents ranked above nonrelevant documents. It
suggests the idea of preferences, but it is defined over absolute judgments. The
calculation of bpref entails inferring that each relevant document is preferred to
every nonrelevant document, but all the relevant documents are “tied”: none is
preferred over any other.
Mizzaro has proposed measures of assessor agreement for both absolute and
preference judgments [11], but we could find no work that empirically evaluated
whether assessors tend to agree more on one or the other as we do here.
In a study that lends support to this work, Rorvig made the case for preferencebased test collections using an idea from mathematical psychology known as

“simple scalability” [12]. He argued that, despite their high cost, preference judgments are an imperative for tasks for which the goal is to find highly-relevant
documents. Rorvig showed that necessary conditions for the application of simple scalability held in practice, but we were unable to find any follow-up studies
on preferences versus absolute judgments.
Thus to the best of our knowledge this is the first comparison of absolute
judgments versus preference judgments in terms of assessor performance. It is
also the first investigation into making preference judgments cost-effective by
reducing the total number needed for evaluation of search engines.

3

Assessor Study

Our study investigated whether preferences are “easier” to make than absolute
judgments by measuring inter-assessor consistency and time spent on each judgment. All judgments will be made on web pages retrieved by the Yahoo!, Google,
and Microsoft Live search engines.
We compared three types of judgments: (1) absolute judgments on a fivepoint scale (Bad, Fair, Good, Excellent, Perfect); (2) binary preference judgments as described above; and (3) a stronger version of preference judgment in
which the assessor can additionally say that he or she definitely preferred one
page over another. To mitigate against assessors abstaining from hard decisions,
neither preference type allowed an “equal” or “same” judgment. 4
3.1

Experimental Design

Measuring agreement requires that each query be seen by at least two different
assessors for each of the three judgment types. Since an assessor cannot see the
same query twice, we needed at least six assessors. Requiring that each assessor
see every query imposed the constraint that assessors could not enter their own
queries; the implications of this will be discussed in the next section.
Judging Interfaces We designed interfaces for each of the three judgments
types. Screenshots for two of them are shown in Figure 1; the binary preference
interface is identical to Figure 1(b) but excludes the “Definitely Here” buttons.
The query was shown at the top of the screen. If the assessor did not understand the query, he or she could obtain context by clicking on the magnifying
glass button to see snippets from the top 20 web pages retrieved by a search
engine. The order of these pages was randomized so as not to influence the
assessor’s judgments.
We allocated the same area to each web page in all three interfaces, regardless
of whether one or two pages were shown. We highlighted the query terms that
we found in a simple parse of the web page to make it easier for the judge to
find relevant content.
4

A followup study that included a “duplicates” judgment on pairs showed results
consistent with those described in the next section.

(a) Absolute judgments.

(b) Preference judgments.
Fig. 1. Screenshots of the judgment interfaces.

Queries We sampled 51 queries from Microsoft’s Live Search query logs. We
chose queries that had previously been judged for the purpose of assessing search
engine quality; in particular, we selected a biased sample that had some diversity
in existing judgments, but was in other respects random. Some of the queries
had clear intent, but most were vague, underspecified, or had myriad possible intents. The queries can generally be considered “informational”; examples include
“andie mcdowell”, “binghamton”, “soda pop and oral hygiene”.
Assessors The six assessors were Microsoft employees. All assessors had backgrounds in information retrieval or related fields and had experience in judging
web pages for relevance.
Web Pages For each query, we took the top five web pages retrieved by three
large search engines. The number of unique pages for a query depended on

the diversity of results retrieved by the engines: if all three retrieved the same
documents, there would only be 5 pages to judge, but if they all retrieved different
documents, there would be 15 pages. There were on average 11.9 unique pages
per query, indicating a high degree of diversity among the top ranked results.
We did not remove web pages that had duplicate content but different URLs.
We made this decision because there were some cases in which the URL provided
some valuable additional information that helped judge relevance. For example,
one query specified a product number. Two identical pages about the product
were retrieved. Neither page contained the product number, but it was part of
one of the URLs. It is important to note, however, that this will be the source
of some disagreements in the preferences judgments.
In order to avoid time delays or temporary internet outages, we pre-captured
web pages by saving images of them to disk. This also guaranteed that the pages
were saved at a fixed point in time and the experiment could be reproduced.
Judgments As shown in Figure 1, the three interfaces had buttons along the top
for judging documents, as well as a “Bad” button at the top left of the displayed
web pages (in the same location relative to the web page for consistency). In the
preference interface, a “Bad” judgment could be used for pages that were clearly
not relevant, had not been properly loaded, or were spam. A page labeled “Bad”
would not be seen again for any subsequent preference judgment.
We gave assessors guidelines explaining differences between relevance labels.
The guidelines included the topicality of the page as well as the ease of finding
relevant content on the page, trust in the domain, the likelihood that the page
reflects the intent of the query, and so on. Assessors used the same guidelines
for both absolute and preference judgments.
We fixed pages in a random order prior to any judging. Assessors made
absolute judgments in that order. For preference judgments, the first two pages
in the fixed order were presented first. The next judgment retained the preferred
page and asked for its preference over the next page in the fixed order. When all
comparisons involving the preferred page were exhausted, judgments restarted
with the next two pages in the fixed order.
3.2

Results and Analysis

Agreement There are two types of agreement: agreement between two assessors
over all judgments, or agreement about each judgment over all assessors. We
chose to look at the latter in an attempt to average out differences in expertise,
prior knowledge, or interpretation of the query.
Agreement for absolute judgments is shown in Table 1. Each cell (J1 , J2 ) is
the probability that one assessor would say J2 (column) given that another said
J1 (row). They are normalized by row, which is why columns do not add to
1. The percentage of pages with each label is 20%, 28%, 25%, 25%, 2%, for Bad,
Fair, Good, Excellent, and Perfect, respectively.
Agreement for preference judgments is shown in Table 2(a). For comparison,
we inferred preferences from the absolute judgments: if the judgment on page A

Bad
Fair
Good
Excellent
Perfect

Bad
0.579
0.208
0.095
0.011
0.000

Fair
0.290
0.332
0.348
0.167
0.042

Good Excellent Perfect
0.118
0.014
0.000
0.309
0.147
0.003
0.286
0.260
0.011
0.264
0.535
0.022
0.125
0.250
0.583

Total
221
307
273
269
24

Table 1. Assessor agreement for absolute judgments.

A < B A, B bad A > B
A < B 0.752 0.033 0.215
A, B bad 0.208 0.567 0.225
A > B 0.201 0.034 0.765
(a) Preferences.

A < B A, B bad A > B
Total
A < B 0.657 0.051 0.292
2580
413 A, B bad 0.297 0.380 0.323
A > B 0.278 0.053 0.669
2757
(b) Inferred preferences.

Total
2530
437
2654

Table 2. Assessor agreement for actual (a) and inferred (b) preference judgments.

AB
A<B
A, B bad
A>B
AB

AB
0.247
0.059
0.000
0.012
0.000

A < B A, B bad
0.621 0.000
0.661 0.043
0.244 0.453
0.212 0.051
0.180 0.005

A>B
0.132
0.221
0.300
0.670
0.680

AB
0.000
0.015
0.002
0.055
0.134

Total
219
2288
406
2389
194

Table 3. Assessor agreement for definite preference judgments.

was greater than the judgment on page B, we inferred that A was preferred to
B. To compare to true preferences, we had to assign some preference to pairs of
pages that were given the same label (“ties”). Table 2(b) gives results when the
assigned preference is random (i.e. the expected value of a coin flip), simulating
an assessor that makes a random judgment about which of two similar pages is
preferred.
Statistical significance between Tables 2(a) and 2(b) can be measured by a
χ2 test comparing the ratio of the number of pairs agreed on to the number
disagreed on for both preferences and inferred preferences. The difference is
significant (χ2 = 143, df = 1, p ≈ 0).
We can also explore redistributing ties at different rates to model different
levels of agreement. Up to about 70% agreement on ties, true preference agreement is still significantly greater than inferred preference agreement. Above 80%,
inferred preference agreement is significantly greater.
Agreement for the two-level “definite” preferences is shown in Table 3. Assessors do not appear to have been very consistent in their use of the “definitely”
judgment. When the definite judgments are pooled together with the preference
judgments (i.e. A < B and A  B treated as identical), the agreement is slightly
less than in Table 2(a), but more than Table 2(b).

Assessor 1
Assessor 2
Assessor 3
Assessor 4
Assessor 5
Assessor 6
Overall

Preference Definite Absolute Overall
3.50
3.41
7.96
3.70
3.24
3.67
6.12
3.55
2.35
2.82
5.56
2.82
4.13
4.30
8.78
4.71
2.72
3.30
8.20
3.17
2.09
2.40
3.21
2.31
2.87
3.15
6.33
3.23

Table 4. Median seconds per judgment by each assessor in each interface.

Time Table 4 shows the median number of seconds spent on each judgment by
each assessor for each interface, along with overall medians for each assessor and
for each interface. 5 Absolute judgments took about twice as long to make as
preferences. As the table shows, there was little variance among assessors.
Two main variables affect the time it takes to judge a page or a pair of pages:
time spent reading the page(s) and time spent deciding on the correct judgment.
One reason that preferences could be faster is that the assessor “memorizes” the
page, or at least forms an impression of it, so that he or she does not have to
re-read it each time it appears. If this were the case, judgments would get faster
as each document had been seen.
To investigate this, we looked at the time each assessor spent making a judgment the first time the page was shown. For the preference, definite, and absolute
judgments, the median time spent on a judgment when seeing a document for
the first time was 3.89, 5.40, and 6.33 seconds, respectively. Thus it seems that
making a preference judgment is faster than making an absolute judgment even
after taking reading time into account.
Additional Analysis The “context search” button, which allowed assessors to
see twenty search results, was used a total of 41 times, slightly under once per
seven queries. There was no correlation between the judgment interface and use
of context search.
After each query, assessors were presented with a feedback page to report
their confidence in their judgments and their understanding of the query on a
scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being least confident and 5 most. The median for both
questions was 4, and despite not having “ownership” of queries there was no
significant correlation between confidence and time spent judging.

4

Evaluating Engines

With preference judgments, standard evaluation measures like average precision
and DCG can no longer be used. We must develop new evaluation measures.
5

Median is reported instead of mean due to hours-long outlying inter-judgment times
that skewed the means upward.

NDCG ppref
DCG
0.748 0.485
NDCG
0.662
ppref
(a) Correlation between
tion measures.

wpref
0.584
0.738
0.950
evalua-

NDCG
DCG
1.000
NDCG
ppref
(b) Agreement on
ences.

ppref wpref
0.873 0.866
0.873 0.866
0.941
system differ-

Table 5. Comparisons between evaluation measures defined over absolute judgments
and measures defined over preferences.

A simple but intuitive measure is the proportion of pairs that are correctly
ordered by the engine. We call this “precision of preferences” or ppref for short.
More formally, over all pairs of pages i, j such that i is preferred to j by an
assessor, ppref is the proportion for which the engine ranked i above j. If neither
i nor j is ranked, ppref ignores the pair. If i is ranked but j is not, ppref considers
i to have been ranked above j.
The pairs in ppref can be weighted for a measure we call wpref. We use a
rank-based weighting scheme: for pages at ranks i and j such that j > i, let
1
. wpref is then the sum of weights wij over pairs i, j
the weight wij = log (j+1)
2
such that i is preferred to j and the rank of i is less than the rank of j. The
normalizing constant is the sum of all weights wij .
4.1

Results

We compared evaluations between four different measures: DCG, normalized
DCG (NDCG), ppref, and wpref. A common formulation of DCG is DCG@k =

Pk
reli
− 1 / log2 (i + 1) [5], where reli is the relevance of the document at
i=1 2
rank i. NDCG@k is DCG@k divided by the DCG of the top k most relevant
documents ranked in descending order of relevance.
DCG and NDCG were calculated over both sets of absolute judgments obtained for each query. Since assessor disagreement could be a source of variance
in a comparison between absolute measures and preference measures, we calculated ppref and wpref over the preferences inferred from the absolute judgments.
Pearson correlations among the four measures calculated for each query
are shown in Table 5(a). The absolute-based measures correlate well, and the
preference-based measures correlate well. The correlation between wpref and
NDCG is nearly as high as the correlation between DCG and NDCG.
We can also measure “agreement” among the measures in determining whether
one system is better than another. We calculate each measure for each query and
each system, then look at the sign of the difference between two measures on
each query. If both measures say the difference is positive or negative, they agree;
otherwise they disagree. As Table 5(b) shows, the measures agree at a fairly high
rate, though preference measures agree more with each other than they do with
absolute measures.

5

Efficient Judging

One of the biggest obstacles to the adaption of preference judgments, is that the
number of document pairs increases polynomially with the number of documents.
Although we had at most 15 documents for any query (105 preferences), in a
large-scale evaluation there would likely be dozens or hundreds, as pages are
drawn from different engines and different test algorithms. A polynomial increase
in the number of judgments means much greater cost in assessor time, no matter
how much faster assessors are at judging. In this section we look at ways to reduce
the number of judgments required.

5.1

Transitivity

If assessors are consistently transitive, the full set of judgments is not necessary;
this is the idea behind comparative sorting algorithms such as heapsort. The
rate of growth in the number of comparisons needed by these algorithms is in
O(n lg n), much slower than the O(n2 ) growth rate of all comparisons.
To evaluate transitivity, we iterated over all triplets of documents i, j, k in
each set of preference judgments. We counted the number of times that, if i was
preferred to j and j was preferred to k, the assessor also preferred i to k.
Transitivity holds for over 99% of triplets on average. Each individual assessor
was consistently transitive at least 98% of the time. This suggests we can use
a sorting algorithm with a minimum of information loss, and possibly improve
assessor consistency at the same time. This agrees with Rorvig’s finding that
preference judgments of relevance are transitive [12]. Figure 2 shows the O(n lg n)
growth rate compared to the O(n2 ) rate.

5.2

“Bad” Judgments

In Section 3 we discussed the use of “Bad” judgments in the preference interface.
About 20% of absolute judgments were “Bad”. Since we can reasonably assume
that nothing will be preferred to these pages, we can additionally assume that
every non-”Bad” page would be preferred to any “Bad” page. Therefore each
“Bad” judgment gives us O(n) preferences.
The empirical reduction in judgments by inferring preferences in this way
is shown in Figure 2. At n = 15, this has reduced the number of judgments
to about 40 (averaged over all queries and all assessors that were assigned a
preference interface for that query). The average decrease from O(n lg n) over
all values of n is 16 judgments.
The curve appears to be increasing at a rate of n lg n, though it is not clear
what it will do as n continues to increase beyond 15. Presumably increasing
n results in a greater proportion of bad pages, so it may be that the curve
asymptotically approaches a linear increase.

110

all pairwise = O(n2)
transitivity = O(n lg n)
bad judgments
utility reordering with early stopping rule
absolute = n

Number of pairwise judgments
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Number of unique documents

Fig. 2. Number of judgments made by assessors under different conditions.

5.3

Cost-Effective Judgments

Applying transitivity and “Bad” judgments still gives us the full set of preference
judgments, though some are inferred rather than asked of the assessor directly.
There are additional steps we can take to increase the utility of the assessors’
time, and, even with some judgments unmade, still prove that differences between systems exist on a particular set of queries. This is based on the work
of Carterette et al. [13], who showed that by estimating the utility of a possible judgment and bounding performance differences, the relative performance of
systems could be determined with very little effort.
Estimating Utility Each judgment has a particular utility in helping us determine the sign of the difference in a measure over each engine. For example, if
ppref is the measure of interest, and engines E1 and E2 both rank document A
above document B, then whether A is preferred to B or not is of no consequence:
the difference in ppref between the two engines will be the same regardless.
Furthermore, since transitivity holds, each judgment we make may bring
additional transitive judgments along with it. For example, if we have already
judged that A is preferred to B and we are debating whether to next judge (B, C)
or (A, C), we should keep in mind that if we judge B > C, we can infer A > C
by transitivity; likewise, if we judge that C > A, we can infer C > B. As above,
whether these transitive judgments are useful depends on how the documents
are ranked by the systems.
The utility function for a preference measure is:
U (A, B) = p(A > B) · gain(A > B) + p(B > A) · gain(B > A), where

gain(A > B) = |w1 (A, B)sgn (r1 (A) − r1 (B)) − w2 (A, B)sgn (r2 (A) − r2 (B))|
X
+
|w1 (A, i)sgn (r1 (A) − r1 (i)) − w2 (A, i)sgn (r2 (A) − r2 (i))|
i|B>i

+

X

|w1 (i, B)sgn (r1 (i) − r1 (B)) − w2 (i, B)sgn (r2 (i) − r2 (B))|

i|i>A

The sums are over pairs (i, B) such that we had previously judged that B > i
and (i, A) where we had judged i > A. These capture the transitive judgments discussed in the paragraph above. The weights wn (i, j) are set for an
evaluation measure: wn (i, j) = 1 gives the utility function for ppref, while
wn (i, j) = 1/ log2 (min{rn (i), rn (j)} + 1) (where rn (i) is the rank of document i
by system n) produces the utility function for wpref.
Note that the expected utility relies on an estimate of the probability that
A is preferred to B. We assume a priori that this probability is 21 . After we
have made some judgments involving A and some judgments involving B, we
may have more information. We can use a simple logistic regression model such
as [14] to estimate these probabilities with no features; the model can easily be
adapted to incorporate any feature.
By judging pairs in decreasing order of utility, we can ensure that after k
judgments we have the most possible confidence in the difference between two
systems. The next question is how big k has to be before we can stop judging.
Early Stopping Rule Suppose after partially completing judgments, the ppref
of E1 is greater than that of E2 (excluding unjudged pairs). If there is no possible
set of judgments to the remaining pairs that would results in E2 “catching up”,
we can safely stop judging.6
Although it is difficult to determine the exact point at which we are guaranteed that E1 must be superior to E2 , we can easily compute bounds on E1 − E2
that allow us to stop judging before evaluating all pairs. A very simple bound
iterates over all unjudged pairs and assigns them a judgment depending on how
much they would “help” either engine. If we have a pair i, j such that E1 ranked
i above j but E2 ranked j above i, then we want to know what happens if j is
preferred to i, i.e. that pair helps E2 and hurts E1 . We assign judgments in this
way for all pairs, ignoring consistency of judgments. This gives us a loose bound.
The number of judgments that are required to differentiate between systems
after applying dynamic reordering based on expected utility and the early stopping rule is shown in Figure 2. The number of judgments has effectively been
reduced to n on average. Reordering and early stopping can be applied to absolute judgments as well, but the gain is not nearly as dramatic: on average it
results in only 1–2 fewer judgments per query.
Although there is no guarantee our results would continue to hold as n increases, we can guarantee that using “Bad” judgments and transitivity will give
6

If we need all of the judgments in order to train a ranking algorithm, on the other
hand, we may not want to stop.

us a slower rate of increase than making all preference judgments, and that using
dynamic reordering and the early stopping rule will give us an even slower rate of
increase. Furthermore, utility-based reordering produces that a set of judgments
is maximally useful no matter when the judging effort is stopped.

6

Conclusion

We have performed the first investigation into the direct acquisition of preference
judgments for relevance and the first comparison of preference judgments to absolute judgments. We have also provided a suite of methods by which preference
judgments can become practical to use for evaluation of search engines.
There are several clear directions for future work: choosing the correct evaluation measure for preferences, the robustness of these measures to missing preferences, and measuring the uncertainty in an evaluation when preferences are missing are three. Additionally, whether training ranking algorithms over preference
judgments rather than inferred preferences results in more robust performance
is an interesting open question.
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